Cloud outage analysis ยท 27 October 2026

Two cloud outages in three weeks: where does your backup live?

On 20 October 2026, Google Cloud's London region went offline for almost eight hours. Three weeks earlier, a network failure on Microsoft Azure hit 18 regions for about six hours. As far as public reports show, neither was a data-loss story. Both are a recovery story: could your business have kept working, and where was your backup while all this happened?

~7h 50mGoogle Cloud London region down, 20 Oct
18Azure regions hit by gateway failures
~6 hourslength of the Azure incident, 30 Sep to 1 Oct
20 daysbetween the two incidents

Key takeaways

  • What: two multi-hour outages at two of the biggest cloud providers, a whole Google Cloud region in London and Azure gateway services across 18 regions.
  • Different failures: Google lost a region. Azure lost the gateways that connect offices and data centres to Azure. Each breaks a different part of a recovery plan.
  • The real risk: a backup only helps if you can reach it when your main systems cannot. A copy in the same region and account fails with everything else.
  • The fix: one immutable, tested copy outside the primary region and account, a second way to reach your systems, and a written plan for the first hour.
  • Not a reason to leave the cloud. It is a reason to know where your data and your backups actually live.

What actually happened

These were not cyberattacks, and the public reports we reviewed do not describe lost data. They describe something that hurts a business almost as much: systems that stayed unreachable for hours.

Google Cloud, London, 20 October

According to Cisco ThousandEyes, the europe-west2 region showed a "complete drop in availability" from about 06:10 UTC. Google attributed the problem to power-related issues on its status page. Services began to recover around 11:30 UTC and Google declared the incident resolved around 14:00 UTC.

Microsoft Azure, 30 September to 1 October

From about 20:30 UTC, gateway services failed in 18 regions at once. ExpressRoute and VPN gateways, the connections many businesses use to link their offices and servers to Azure, were hit first. Azure Firewall management, Application Gateway and Azure VMware Solution were also reported as affected. Microsoft said the timing correlated with infrastructure operating system servicing activity and paused that work. At the time of writing, the failure mechanism had not been confirmed.

IncidentWhat failedLengthStated cause
Google Cloud, 20 Oct 2026The whole europe-west2 (London) region became unavailableAbout 7 h 50 minPower-related issues, per Google's status page as reported by ThousandEyes
Azure, 30 Sep to 1 Oct 2026ExpressRoute and VPN gateways, plus other network services, in 18 regionsAbout 6 hoursNot confirmed. Timing correlated with infrastructure OS servicing, which Microsoft paused
30 Sep 20:30 Azure gateways fail in 18 regions ExpressRoute and VPN gateways first 1 Oct ~02:30 Resolved after about 6 hours Cause not confirmed; servicing paused 20 days later 20 Oct 06:10 London region goes offline Google Cloud europe-west2, power-related 20 Oct ~11:30 Services begin to recover 20 Oct ~14:00 Google declares it resolved About 7 h 50 min after first impact
All times UTC and approximate. Sources: Cisco ThousandEyes for Google Cloud; Microsoft's Azure status updates as relayed by IsDown and Archyde.

Why a few hours is a big deal

Cloud providers publish uptime targets, and when they miss them the usual remedy is a service credit. A credit does not bring back a day of sales or a missed payroll run. What matters to your business is how long it can operate without the affected systems, which is your recovery time objective (RTO). Our guide to RTO and RPO explains how to set one.

Put an example four-hour target next to these two outages and both run past it.

Example target (RTO): 4 hours Azure gateways, 30 Sep to 1 Oct ~6 h Google Cloud London, 20 Oct ~7 h 50 min 0 h2 h4 h6 h8 h Red is the time beyond a 4-hour target. The 4 hours is an example, not a rule.
Both incidents ran past a four-hour recovery target. Your own target may be shorter or longer, but the gap is the same question: what does the business do while it waits?

Two outages, two different layers

The incidents did not break the same thing, and that is the point. Your cloud setup has layers, and a failure in any of them can take you offline.

Your office and staff Where people work The link to the cloud VPN, ExpressRoute, gateways The cloud region Data centres, power, regional network Your servers, data and backups What you are paying to protect Admin accounts and keys Who can delete or change anything Azure gateways30 Sep to 1 Oct Google CloudLondon, 20 Oct Ransomwareand stolen logins
The two October outages hit different layers. A third risk, a compromised admin account, can wipe out your backups without any outage at all.

Where your backup lives decides what survives

The same backup job, stored in different places, gives very different results when something fails. This table shows how three common setups hold up against the three risks above.

Regionoutage Gateway orlink outage Ransomware orstolen login Same region,same accountin-region vaultDown withthe regionSafe, buthard to reachDeletable withstolen accessAnother region,same accountcopy elsewhereStillavailableSafe, buthard to reachDeletableunless lockedSeparate accountor providerwith immutabilityStillavailableRestore overanother pathLocked againstchanges Protected Partly Not protected
A general guide, not a guarantee. Real protection depends on how each backup product and storage account is configured, so test it.

Only the last row survives all three. That does not mean every business needs the most expensive setup. It means you should know which row you are in, because most small businesses discover the answer during the outage.

What to do this week

None of this needs a new platform. It needs five answers and one afternoon.

Ask yourselfA good answer looks like
Where does each system, and each backup of it, live (region and account)?Written down, with at least one copy outside the primary region and account
If our VPN or dedicated cloud link is down, how do staff reach systems?A second path, or a documented offline procedure
How long can each system be down?An agreed RTO per system, not one number for everything
When did we last restore from the offsite copy?Within the last quarter, timed. See our restore test checklist
Who decides to fail over, and who tells customers?Named people, with phone numbers that do not depend on the cloud

Step 1: Map your systems and backups

List every business system and the region and account it runs in. Next to each, write where its backup is stored. Most businesses find at least one backup sitting beside the system it protects.

Step 2: Keep one immutable copy somewhere else

Store at least one backup copy in a separate region, and ideally a separate account or provider, with immutability turned on (object lock or similar), so that neither a regional outage nor a stolen admin login can remove it.

Step 3: Give yourself a second way in

If your only route to the cloud is one VPN or one dedicated link, the Azure incident shows what happens when it fails. Keep a second route or a documented break-glass procedure, and test it.

Step 4: Set service-health alerts

Subscribe to your provider's service-health notifications (Azure Service Health, Google Cloud Service Health) so you hear about an incident from the provider before you hear about it from your staff.

Step 5: Write the first-hour plan

One page, agreed in advance. It should say who confirms the outage, what the business does in the meantime, and the point at which you restore from the offsite copy instead of waiting.

No Yes No Yes Does the provider's status page show an incident in your region? Check your own side: changes, DNS, certificates Is an essential system down? Keep watching. Brief staff and customers Run your written plan: workaround or failover, customer notice Past your RTO? Restore the offsite copy into a healthy region Afterwards: write down what failed and what it cost, then fix the plan
Decide this path before an outage. In the first hour nobody has time to design a plan.

The bigger lessons

Outages are normal, so plan for them

Even the largest providers have multi-hour failures, and these two happened in the same autumn. The question is not whether it will happen to a provider you use, but whether it costs you an inconvenience or a bad week.

Hybrid links are a single point of failure

Many setups depend on one VPN or ExpressRoute connection for staff access, backup traffic and monitoring at once. Treat that link as a critical system and give it a fallback.

Backup location is a design decision

"It is backed up" is not an answer. "It is backed up in another region and account, immutable, and we restored from it in September" is.

Recovery is a plan, not a product

Our guide to backup versus recovery makes the same point: copies protect your data, and a rehearsed plan protects your business.

Frequently asked questions

What happened in the Google Cloud outage on 20 October 2026?

According to Cisco ThousandEyes, Google Cloud's europe-west2 (London) region showed a complete drop in availability from about 06:10 UTC. Google attributed it to power-related issues. Services began recovering around 11:30 UTC and Google declared the incident resolved around 14:00 UTC, about 7 hours 50 minutes after it began.

What happened in the Azure outage on 30 September 2026?

From about 20:30 UTC on 30 September, Azure gateway services (ExpressRoute and VPN gateways, with Azure Firewall management, Application Gateway and Azure VMware Solution also affected) failed across 18 regions, for about six hours. Microsoft said the timing correlated with infrastructure operating system servicing activity, which it paused. At the time of writing the failure mechanism was not confirmed.

Was any customer data lost in these outages?

None of the public reports we reviewed describe data loss. They describe loss of availability: systems and connections that could not be reached for hours. That is still a serious problem for a business that needs those systems to operate.

Does running in more than one availability zone protect me?

It protects you from one data centre failing, which is a common problem. It does not help if a whole region becomes unavailable, as London did on 20 October, or if the gateway that connects your office to the cloud fails, as in the Azure incident. Those need a copy and a plan outside the affected region and link.

Is a cloud backup enough?

Only if it is stored somewhere that does not fail together with your main systems. A backup in the same region and account as your workload can be unreachable during a regional outage and can be deleted by an attacker with stolen admin access. Keep at least one immutable copy in a separate region, account or provider.

What is an immutable backup?

A backup that cannot be changed or deleted for a set retention period, even by an administrator. It is usually built with object lock or WORM storage. It protects against ransomware and mistakes, but not against an outage by itself, which is why location matters as well.

Do small businesses need a multi-cloud setup?

Usually not. Running everything live in two clouds is complex and expensive. What most small businesses need is simpler: one tested, immutable copy of their data outside the primary region and account, a documented way to work during an outage, and a recovery time they have agreed in advance.

Not sure where your backups live?

We help small and mid-size businesses in Ontario, across Canada and in the United States answer three questions fast: Where are our backups? Are they safe from the same failure as our systems? And can we restore in the time we need?

  • Recovery readiness review: a structured look at your systems, backups and recovery objectives.
  • Backup location and immutability review: we map where each copy lives and what could take it out.
  • Restore testing: we prove backups by restoring them, not by reading a green tick.

Talk to Excelytech Check your recovery readiness

Sources

This article reflects public information as of 27 October 2026. Microsoft had not published a full post-incident review for the Azure incident in the sources we reviewed, and Google's detailed incident report for 20 October may add facts. We will update this article when they do.