Ransomware case study ยท 19 November 2026

BlackNevas ransomware wiped a whole VMware estate and its backups, without a single exploit

On 13 November 2026, Kaspersky's incident response team published one of the clearest ransomware case studies of the year. Over ten days, a group using the BlackNevas name wiped four VMware ESXi hosts, every virtual machine on them, both vCenter servers and the backup system meant to bring it all back. They did not need a software bug. They logged in. Here is what happened, in plain English, and what it means for where your own backups live.

10 daysfrom first access to the final wipe
0software vulnerabilities exploited
4 + 2ESXi hosts and vCenter servers destroyed
23 secfor every VM on the recovery host to stop

Key takeaways

  • The backups went first. Days before the servers were hit, the attackers switched off antivirus on the backup servers, stopped the backup jobs and encrypted the recovery repositories.
  • No patch would have stopped it. Every step used a stolen password and a normal admin feature.
  • The disaster recovery site fell too, because it was managed with the same credentials as production.
  • Keep one copy that admin rights cannot delete: immutable, offline, or held by a separate provider with separate logins.
  • Test a restore as if vCenter and Active Directory are gone, because in this case they were.

What happened

Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) investigated the attack and published the timeline on its Securelist blog. The victim is not named. The ransom notes named BlackNevas, a ransomware family Kaspersky links to the older Trigona code base. The investigators note that the attribution rests on the ransom notes and on how the commands were written, since they did not recover the attack program itself.

What is clear is the result. Four ESXi hosts were hit, along with the virtual machines on them, both vCenter Server appliances (the consoles used to manage the hosts) and the connected backup infrastructure. That includes the vCenter at the disaster recovery site, the place the business would have turned to after an attack.

Step by step

  1. Stolen logins. The attackers took credentials from systems outside the virtualization layer and used them to log in to vCenter. No VMware flaw was involved.
  2. Backup servers next. With admin rights on the backup servers, they pulled out the passwords stored there: service accounts, hypervisor logins and repository access.
  3. A foothold on the recovery site. They logged in to the disaster recovery vCenter as root over SSH and installed MeshAgent, a legitimate remote-management tool, within 43 seconds. About four hours later they added a hidden tunnel disguised as a VMware service.
  4. A "compliance" change that opened the door. They used vCenter Host Profiles, a normal feature for keeping host settings consistent, to switch on SSH on the ESXi hosts. SSH was running 33 seconds later, and the logins came from vCenter's own trusted address.
  5. The backups switched off. Days before the final blow, antivirus on the backup environment was disabled, backup services were stopped and the recovery repositories were encrypted.
  6. A test run, then the wipe. They uploaded a program called esx64, ran a 16-second self-test, waited about three hours, then ran it for real. Every virtual machine on the recovery host stopped within 23 seconds.

The program overwrote roughly the first 2 KB of each virtual disk, enough to destroy the partition tables that tell a system where its data starts. The investigators say some data might be partly recoverable from backup copies of those tables. Hoping a forensic specialist can piece some of it back together is not a recovery plan.

1. Stolen logins from other systems No exploit, just valid accounts 2. Into vCenter and the backup servers Stored passwords pulled from the backup software 3. Backups switched off, days ahead Antivirus off, jobs stopped, repositories encrypted 4. Host Profiles switch on SSH A normal admin feature used as a way in 5. Four ESXi hosts and both vCenters wiped Including the disaster recovery site The restore path was gone before step 5 started
The attack in five steps. The backups were taken out before the servers, so there was nothing clean to restore from.

Why this one matters for small businesses

It is tempting to read "four ESXi hosts and two vCenters" and think this is a big-company problem. It is not. The pattern scales down perfectly to a business with one or two servers:

Kaspersky published a related case a week earlier, on 6 November, where attackers reached ESXi and Proxmox hosts with stolen root passwords, including one shared root password across systems. A separate investigation into a group called The Gentlemen focused on stealing backup credentials. The direction is consistent: ransomware crews now plan around your backups, not just your servers.

This is also why having a backup is not the same as being able to recover. The victim here had backups and a disaster recovery site. What they did not have was a copy the attackers could not touch.

Where your backup lives decides whether you recover

Backup setupSurvives an attacker with your admin password?
Backup to a NAS or server on the same domainNo. Same logins, same network. This is what failed here.
Second site or replica managed with the same vCenter or admin accountsNo. The DR vCenter was wiped in this case.
Cloud copy where the backup server holds the delete keysOften not. Stolen stored credentials can reach it.
Immutable copy (object lock or hardened repository) with a retention lockYes, for the lock period, even with admin rights.
Offline or air-gapped copy, rotated on a scheduleYes, as long as it was disconnected before the attack.
Managed copy held by a separate provider with separate logins and MFAYes, if your staff accounts cannot delete it.

The rule of thumb is the 3-2-1-1-0 approach: three copies, on two kinds of storage, one off-site, one immutable or offline, and zero errors in your last restore test. The fourth number is the one this victim was missing.

What to do this week

1. Separate backup logins from everything else

The account that manages your backups should not be a domain admin, should not be used for day-to-day work, and should have its own multi-factor authentication. Kaspersky's own advice is to separate credentials for ordinary administration, virtualization control and recovery. Check what passwords your backup software has saved and what each one can reach.

2. Make at least one copy impossible to delete

Turn on immutability (sometimes called object lock or a hardened repository) for at least one backup copy, with a retention period longer than an attacker would usually wait. Attackers in this case spent ten days inside. A seven-day lock would not have been enough; 14 to 30 days is a safer starting point.

3. Lock down the management consoles

4. Watch the backup system itself

In this case the warning signs were there days before the wipe: antivirus switched off on backup servers and backup jobs stopped. A missed backup job should page someone, not sit in an inbox. If nobody would notice your backups stopping for a week, fix that first.

5. Test a restore with the main systems gone

Most restore tests quietly assume vCenter, Active Directory and the backup server are all still working. Run one that assumes they are not. Can you log in to your backup copy? Do you have the encryption key written down somewhere outside the network? How long does it take to bring back the server you need first? Our restore test checklist walks through it, and RTO and RPO explains how to set the target.

Patching still matters, but it is not the whole answer

Many ESXi ransomware attacks do start with a software flaw, and you should keep hosts, vCenter and backup software current. This case is a reminder that the most important control is not a patch. It is making sure that one stolen password cannot reach both your data and your way back.

Frequently asked questions

What happened in the BlackNevas ESXi attack?

Over about ten days, attackers used stolen logins to take over an organization's VMware vCenter servers, switched off and encrypted the backup environment, then wiped four ESXi hosts and every virtual machine on them. Kaspersky's incident response team published the case on 13 November 2026.

Did the attackers exploit a VMware vulnerability?

No. Kaspersky found no hypervisor exploit. The attackers logged in with credentials taken from other systems and then used normal VMware management features, including vCenter Host Profiles, to switch on SSH on the hosts.

Why did the backups fail?

The backups were reachable with the same kind of administrator access the attackers already had. Days before the wipe they disabled antivirus on the backup servers, stopped the backup services, encrypted the recovery repositories and pulled stored passwords from the backup software.

Would patching VMware have stopped this attack?

Not on its own. Patching is still needed, but this attack used valid accounts. Separate admin accounts, multi-factor authentication on vCenter and backup consoles, and a backup copy that production credentials cannot delete are what would have changed the outcome.

We are a small business with one or two VMware or Hyper-V servers. Does this apply to us?

Yes. The lesson is not specific to VMware or to large companies. If the account that runs your servers can also delete your backups, one stolen password can take out both. The same applies to Hyper-V, Proxmox and backup appliances on the same network.

What is an immutable or offline backup?

It is a backup copy that cannot be changed or deleted for a set period, even by an administrator, or one that is kept off the network. It is the copy that survives when attackers have full admin rights over everything else.

Could one stolen password reach your backups?

We help small and mid-size businesses in Ontario, across Canada and in the United States keep a backup copy that attackers cannot delete, and prove it restores.

  • Backup exposure review: we map which accounts can delete or change each backup copy, and close the gaps.
  • Immutable and off-site backup: we set up a locked copy with separate logins and multi-factor authentication.
  • Disaster recovery testing: we restore your critical servers with the main systems assumed gone, and time it.

Talk to Excelytech Check your recovery readiness

Sources

This article reflects public reporting on Kaspersky GERT's investigation as of 19 November 2026. The victim and attack dates have not been disclosed.